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THE LIABILITY OF AN AVIATOR FOR DAMAGE TO
PERSONS AND PROPERTY ON THE GROUND
By JuuiAN G. HEARNE,

JR.*

In dealing with the subject matter of this article, many
writers have approached the question of an aviator's liability as
though there were but two possible solutions,-that is, the imposition of absolute liability for all injuries to persons and property on the ground, or to hold the aviator only for injuries due
to his negligence.' Statutes of many states have adopted the first
proposed solution, several states have enacted laws prescribing the
second, while other commonwealths have merged the two, sometimes adding or subtracting various features.! Therefore, the sum
total of all the legislation on the subject presents a picture as colorful as the rainbow, and as far reaching in its extremes, notwithstanding the fact that the purpose of each enactment is the same,that is, to establish a just rule of tort liability for airplane cases.
It is the purpose of this article to approach the question
from a different angle, by suggesting that liability should depend
on the cause of the fall of the airplane (or whatever it is that inflicts the injury), and then to suggest how common law rules
should be applied to the various classifications of causes. Just
results may be reached without a liability statute, and West Virginia, along with such outstanding states as Massachusetts, New
York, Ohio, Virginia and others, has wisely refrained from any
*Member of the Bar, Wheeling, West Virginia.
'See, for example, Baldwin, Liability for Accidents in Aerial Navigation
(1910) 9 MIcH. L. REv. 20; Bogert, Proble-s in Aviation Law (1921) 6
CORN. L. Q. 271. For an exhaustive bibliography on all phases of aviation
law, see Hirschberg, The Liability of the Aviator to Third Persons (1929)
2 So. CALIF. L. REv. 405.
2Del. Laws 1923, c. 199; Hawaii Laws 1923, c. 109, REv. LAws (1925) §§
3891-3905 (1925); Idaho Laws 1923, c. 92; Ind. Laws 1927, c. 43; Md. Laws
1927, c. 637; Mich. Laws 1923, p. 224; Minn. Laws 1929, c. 219; Nev. Laws
1923, c. 66; N. J. Laws 1929, c. 311; N. 0. Laws 1929, c. 190; N. D. Laws
1923, c. 1; S. D. Laws 1925, c. 6; Tenn. Laws 1923, c. 30; Utah Laws 1923.
c. 24; and Vermont Public Acts 1923, p. 155. These statutes impose absolute liability on the owner of the aircraft, in the absence of contributory
negligence of the landsman,-and on the pilot if he was negligent. This
is the Uniform State Law on the subject, as set forth in the text of this
article, infra. Pennsylvania Laws 1929, Act 317, makes the rules of torts on
land applicable to aircraft cases. Ariz. Laws 1929, c. 38, and Conn. Public
Acts 1929, c. 253, impose liability only for the negligence of the pilot. R. I.
Laws 1929, c. 1435, makes the owner absolutely liable unless the plane was
in the hands of a lessee, and in such a case the owner is only liable for
negligence; but the injured party has a lien on the aircraft. S. C. Laws
1929, Act 189, and Wis. Laws 1929, c. 348 make the owner and lessee jointly
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such enactment. Our discussion will be devoted chiefly to cases in
which the damage occurs while the pilot is lawfully avigating'
his airplane in the exercise of due care, after proper inspection
beforehand, for these will all be cases of first impression when they
arise. Cases in which the aviator's negligence is the proximate
cause of the injury present no new questions, for in most cases
where negligence,-including the violation of a statute,-can be
shown on the part of the aviator the present rules of tort law are
sufficiently broad to be justly applicable.
In speaking of the violation of statutes, it should be pointed
out that West Virginia has prescribed' twenty-five hundred
feet as the minimum safe altitude for flying over any city, town
or village except at landing fields, while the Federal Air Commerce Act of 1926,' and the Department of Commerce Regulations!
promulgated in pursuance thereof, are of their own force the law
of this State on many points directly concerning the duties of a
pilot during flight and in preparation of flight.' On turning to
liable for all injuries, and others only to the extent of their own negligence.
With the exception of Pennsylvania, the courts of each of these states are
thus confined within definite bounds in the determination of aircraft damage
suits, and it appears that the legislatures of some states radically disagree
with the law making bodies of other commonwealths as to what constitutes
a just rule to follow.
3W. VA. REV. CODE (1931), c. 8, Art. 11, § 1, defines avigation as "the
steering, directing, or managing of an aircraft, in or through the air, and is
here used as a substitute for aerial navigation". This word was probably
coined by the Legislature of New York, as the New York Act seems to be
the earliest statute in which that word is used. N. Y. Acts 1928, c. 233, Art.

14, § 240.

'W. VA. REv. CODE (1931), c. 8, Art. 11, § 12.
144 Stat. 568; 49 U. S. C. A., 1930 Cum. PocxEr PART § 171 at seq. See
also an enlightening article by F. P. Lee, legislative counsel for the U. S.
Senate, entitled "The Air Commerce Act of 1926", (1926) 12 A. B. A. J.
317.
8"Air Commerce Regulations"-published in pamphlet form by Dept. of
Commerce. Also published in 1929 U. S. Av. R. 185.
The Federal legislation and
'There is no Federal liability statute.
ordinances require registration of aircraft and airmen in the case of interstate and foreign air commerce, and leave it optional for others. Other
features are stated in the text, infra. The constitutionality of the Federal
regulations, as applied to intrastate aviation, is sometimes challenged, but it
is worthy of note that the Uniform State Law omits a traffic rules section,
due to the belief that the Federal Act would be upheld. (See HANDBOOK O
NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND

PROCEEDiNGs, (1922) pp. 319, 321.) The Committee on Aeronautics of the
American Bar Association has also approved this section of the Federal Act
as constitutional. (46 Am. Bar Assn. Reports 498-530), while more recently,
Mr. Frederick D. Fagg, Jr., Managing Director of Airlaw Institute at Northwestern University, expressed the same opinion in quoting Mr. George B.
Logan, Chairman of the Bar Association Committee. National Conference
Held on Uniform Aeronautic Begulatory Laws (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 77, at
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Chapter 8 of the Air Commerce Regulations, known as the "Air
Traffic Rules", we find that these rules apply to all aircraft alike,
commercial and non-commercial, intrastate and interstate. Besides
providing a set of traffic rules for the navigation of aircraft, this
Chapter prescribes certain altitudes below which flying is pro.
hibited, according to specified circumstances.' It regulates stunt
flying and prohibits it over cities, towns and settlements; and provides that any deviation from the "Air Traffic Rules" shall be
unlawful and subject the offender to a civil penalty, payable to
the Secretary of Commere,-but it is further specified that a
violation of the Rules shall not of itself make the act unlawful
"when special circumstances render a departure necessary to avoid immediate danger or when such departure is
required because of stress of weather conditions or other unavoidable cause".
Another section specifically provides
"When an aircraft is in flight the pilot shall not drop or
release, or permit any person to drop or release, any object
or thing which may endanger life or injure property, except
when necessary to the personal safety of the pilot, passengers
or crew.'1
Chapters 2 and 3 of the Regulations require inspections by the
owners of registered aircraft before and after flights, and impose
other duties on the owners of registered aircraft in order to insure airworthiness. In view of these provisions, if an aviator injure a person in a village by reason of doing a stunt, or if he injure persons or property by flying lower than the minimum safe
altitude, or by some other violation of law, we would have a breach
of a law imposed for the protection of persons and property,
81. As to interstate and foreign commerce there should be no question as to
the constitutionality. For purposes of our discussion we will assume that
these Federal laws are constitutional.
8This section provides that aircraft shall be flown at a height sufficient to
permit of a reasonably safe emergency landing,-which in no case shall be
less than 1000 feet,-over any city, town or settlement; elsewhere 500 feet,
except at airports and landing fields. Observe that in some cases it may be
possible to fly over a city at an altitude of between 1000 and 2500 feet and
still
be able to make a safe landing. In such a case the Federal and State
Acts would conflict, and one or the other would have to give way. The
writer believes that the Federal Act should prevail, but u discussion of constitutional law is beyond the scope of this article. See note 7, supra.
'It should be observed that it is the pilot on whom the duty of care is
imposed. It seems unreasonable that a passenger who dropped any article
causing harm below should not be held to answer also, on the basis of his own
negligence, and courts would probably so hold.
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which, according to West Virginia decisions,"0 would constitute
actionable negligence; while a United States District Court has
held" that flight below the minimum safe altitude, which in that
case was 500 feet, constitutes trespass on the land beneath.
Now, take a case in which no deviation from the "Air Traffic
Rules" or some statute is responsible for the injuries caused the
plaintiff landsman, but nevertheless, the aviator is negligent in
the preparation of his aircraft for the flight, or becomes negligent
in the operation of his craft while flying. The result is the act
complained of, such as collision with an automobile prudently
driven on a public highway. The New York Court of Claims has
imposed liability in such a case,' and properly allowed the plaintiff the benefit of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in order to establish negligence, holding that
"In absence of any explanation of how the collision occured, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur raises the presumption
of negligence on the part of the airplane.""
So, we see that where a violation of a statute or ordinance or
other regulation is responsible for the plaintiff's injury, or where
the injury is due to defendant's negligence, it is not unjust to
impose liability, and existing tort rules are sufficient to do so.
But it is the chief purpose of this article to deal with cases
10Carrico v. R. R., 35 W. Va., 389, 14 S. E. 12 (1891) ; Dickinson v. Colliery
Co., 71 W. Va. 325, 76 S. E. 654 (1912); Bobbs v. Morgantown Press Co.,
89 W. V. 206, 108 S. E. 879 (1921).
"Swetland v. Curtiss Airports, 41 F. (2d) 929 (D. C., N. D. Ohio 1930).
See also Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 170 N. E. 385 (Mass. 1930),
where flight over land at one hundred feet, contrary to statute, was held to
be a trespass. It should be noted that the courts concerned in both cases
limited their decisions to the few points involved, chief of which was flight
below the minimum safe altitude, and Judge Hahn took care to point out
that "no inquiry as to the general or absolute liability for injuries to persons or property due to the lawful or illegal operation of aircraft, whether
arising from negligence, accident or otherwise, is involved in the case at bar".
Cf. Commonwealth v. Nevin and Smith, 2 Dist. & Co. Reps. (Penn.) 241, 1928
U. S. Av. R. 39 (1922). Commented upon in (1922) 71 PA. LAw REV. 88.
In this case an inferior court held that flight over certain posted property
was not an "illegal entry" thereon, within the meaning of a criminal statute,
although the altitude was as low as 50 feet. This was before our present
day statutes had been enacted, however.
v. State of N. Y., 1929 U. S. Av. R. 42.
1Sollak
2"A tabulation of accidents occuring in civil aviation during the year
1928, prepared by the Dept. of Commerce, shows that only 8.11% were of
undetermined cause. The remainder were attributed to errors of operating
personelle, power plant failures, structural failures, and other causes which
might reasonably be said to have arisen from some negligent act of omission
"Aircraft Accident Reports" 308, National Advisory
or commission."
Committee on Aeronautics: Quoted from A. L. Newman II, Damage Liability
in Aircraft Cases (1929). 29 CoL. L. REv. 1039, at 1046.
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in which we have no violation of a statute or ordinance and in
which the aviator is in the exercise of due care. We may again
look to the common law in determining what is due care on the
part of the pilot, and it has been held1' that, in landing an airplane,
it is the duty of the pilot to use
"ordinary care, which is the degree of care that men of
reasonable vigilance and foresight ordinarily exercise in that
operation",
while a charge that, in landing an airplane, a pilot must use "the
highest degree of care" has been held to be erroneous.' It has
also been held ' that the pilot of an airplane which is a common
carrier
"must use the utmost care and diligence for the safe
carriage of passengers".
So, we see that "due care" will simply depend on the circumstances of each case. The old balloon case of Guille v. Swam' immediately comes to mind, but this case does not help us, for a
balloon is guided by the winds and its descent is usually controlled
by the whims of Nature rather than by the balloonist, all of which
is expected, while an airplane is guided by the hand of man and
is subject to his complete control. The easiest way out would be
to apply the rule of the Uniform State Law, 8 and make the owner
absolutely liable for all injuries to persons and property caused
by
"the ascent, descent or flight of the aircraft or the dropping or falling of any object therefrom, whether such owner
was negligent or not, unless the injury is caused in whole or
.An
in part by ...... [contributory negligence] ......
aeronaut who is not the owner or lessee shall be liable only for
the consequences of his own negligence."
But there are objections to this rule in its entirety. For instance,
the owner would be liable for an injury caused by a forced landing, although the reason for such landing was due to a collision
with another plane which was entirely at fault for the smashup
in the air. Also, the owner would be liable, although he had loaned or leased his machine to a licensed aviator, as competent as
Admiral Byrd or Colonel Lindbergh, to use on a "frolic of his
1,
Sollak v. State of N. Y., &upran. 12.
25 bid.

2Allison v. Standard Air Lines, 1930 U. S. Av. R. 292 (Fed. 9th Cir. 1930).
1719 Johns. (N. Y.) 381, 10 Am. Decs. 234 (1822).
18Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, § 5. See n. 2, supra.
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own", or if the plane bad been stolen. The principles of agency
should apply, of course, but there is no reason why the owners of
aircraft should be singled out and liability imposed on them in
cases in which their agents are exempt, while owners of other
vehicles are not subject to any such rule,--even assuming that
aviation is a dangerous occupation.
The writer contends that liability on the part of the nonnegligent aviator should depend on how the damage or injury
occurs.' Let us consider, therefore, the various kinds of airplane
accidents which can occur under non-negligent circumstances. To
simplify our discussion, we can divide our cases into six natural
groups, the first two of which are as follows:
1. Where a force wrongfully set in motion by another
person, or where the omission of another person under duty
to act, causes the damage complained of, as where another
aviator wrongfully collides with the defendant, forcing him
down on plaintiff's premises, or, to put an extreme case, where
defendant is brought down by rifle fire;
2. Where defendant willfully does the act causing the
damage complained of, due to the exigencies of an emergency
caused by the wrongful act or omission of another person, as
where defendant is forced to swoop down on the plaintiff's
premises in order to avoid a collision with some reckless
aviator.
In these two situations we see that some third party is responsible
for the injury,-therefore, it is submitted that it would be imposing an unjust burden on aviation to impose liability on the
pilot in such cases. There is no reason why aviation should be
singled out, and absolute liability imposed, while other enterprises
are not held to answer for the acts or omissions of "the other fellow". Nor would this doctrine impose a hardship on the injured
landsman- for when a third party is to blame for the collision he
would be liable in damages to the extent of the injury.' In point
with the first situation is Woods v. Greathead,' where defendant's
automobile was thrown on plaintiff's premises by reason of a collision with X. No liability was imposed on defendant. Again,
in Trauerman v. Oliver's Administrator,' where defendant's car
was knocked against the deceased by X's car, the personal repre"Of course, contributory negligence on part of plaintiff landsman must bo
considered, as in any other case. In our discussion we will assume his duo
care.
Boggs v. Jewell Tea Co., 266 Pa. 428, 109 At]. 666 (1920).
151 L. T. 10 (Eng. 1921).
125 Va. 458) 99 S. E. 647 (1919).
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sentative was not allowed to recover. In point with the second
situation is Fleming v. Hartrick,' where defendant's car was
forced to pull off to the side of the road in order to avoid collision
with X's car, thereby hitting plaintiff's intestate. No liability was
imposed on defendant. In another case the defendant, being pursued by X, who threatened to inflict bodily harm, ran on to plaintiff's premises to escape. No liability was imposed for this intrusion.-'
Consider next the following group of cases in which no third
party is involved:
3. Where the defendant willfully does the act causing
the damage complained of because of the exigencies of an
emergency caused by natural forces, or other (and perhaps unknown) causes not based on negligence, as where defendant is
forced to land on plaintiff's premises or to throw ballast thereon by reason of a violent and sudden storm above, or by reason of his motor suddenly going dead;
4. Where natural forces or other causes not based on
negligence directly cause the damage complained of, regardless of the will of the pilot, as where the plane encounters an
air pockete and goes into a dive, or where some latent defect
which could not have been discovered by reasonable inspection
before flight, causes part of the wing to collapse, forcing the
plane down.
It should be apparent that cases in these groups involve dangers
which other means of transportation do not have to contend with.
A pilot may have his aircraft in perfect condition for flight,but from the moment he takes off until he finally descends, he is
always subject to the possibility of encountering unavoidable dangers, which are nearly always unseen. That the possibility of encountering perils in aviation is greater than in other means of
transportation is attested by the higher rate of insurance for
aviation. The pilot realizes all this when he takes off and he also
knows that in case of emergency he may be forced to descend, or
that he may even come down involuntarily, on a dwelling house,
barn, or on whatever happens to be in the path of his fall. Each
ascent subjects every landsman to this possibility of danger, which,
-100 W. Va. 714, 131 S. E. 558 (1926).
2
'Vanderburgh v. Traux, 4 Denio 464 (N. Y. 1847); Cunningham v. Pitzer,
2 W. Va. 264, 94 Am. Dec. 526 (1867).
"It is the writer's understanding that aviators have discarded the term
"lair pocket", and in lieu thereof, the expression "the air is bumpy,' is
used. However that may be, certain atmospheric conditions often cause
airplanes to drop abruptly many feet at a time, while sometimes the ship is
carried upward by the same reason.
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obviously, the landsman can not avoid. In these two situations,
unlike classifications one and two, we have good reason to single
out the aviator while exempting others.
A case falling within the third classification could well be
disposed of under the rule of the Minnesota Court, which held the
owner of a ship liable for damages to a wharf, caused by the captain's prudent and necessary act of making his ship fast to the
wharf in order to save the craft from floundering in a violent
storm' The fourth classification is different, however, in that no
willful act on the part of the aviator is involved, for the airplane
no longer is under his control. Trespass will not lie, for the injury
would be consequential rather than by the aviator's direct act, for
his airplane would be "running away from him", and his acts,
if any, would be ineffective. It has been held that where a usually
gentle horse, drawing a wagon and driver, becomes frightened at
some object and, becoming unmanageable, runs on the premises
of another and does damage, there is no liability. And even the
Minnesota case stated that had the ship been driven against the
pier by force of the waves alone, rather than by the captain's act,
that there could be no recovery. So, trespass being inapplicable,
we turn to trespass on the case, and find that it is based on negligence, with few exceptions.
The rule governing trespassing
animals is obviously inapplicable to aircraft cases, while the doctrine of Rytands v. Fletcher' is not only inapplicable, but is purported to have been rejected by the West Virginia Court.'. In
affirming this rejection, the Court says,'
"It is a well settled principle of law that one in the
prosecution of a lawful act or business is not liable for an
injury resulting from an unavoidable accident which occurs
without any blame or fault on his part."
But these are only supposed obstacles in the way of imposing
liability. The Court need not be troubled by the doctrine of stare
decisis, for there are no aviation cases in point at all, and our
21Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N. W.

221 (1910).

Gibbons v. Pepper, 1 Ld. Ray. 38, 91 Eng. Reprint 957 (1696); see also
Coller v. Knox, 222 Pa. 362, 71 Atl. 539 (1908).
2
L. R., 3 H. L. 330 (1868).
Veith v. Salt Co., 51 W. Va. 96, 41 S. E. 187 (1902). See article by
Prof. E. C. Dickinson, The RBylands v. Fletcher Bule in W~est Virginia (1924)
30 W. VA. L. Q. 248. Mr. Dickinson cites a number of cases to show that
our Court is hopelessly confused on this point, and that it is, therefore, uncertain just what the law of this State is in regard to this doctrine.
o Mahaffey v. Lumber Co., 61 W. Va. 571, 56 S. E. 893 (1907).
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Legislature has wisely refrained from enacting liability statutes,
which must, of necessity, be only general. The writer suggests
that, to impose liability here, the sic utere tuo doctrine of the West
Virginia case of Wilson v. Phoenix Powder Company' should be
applied. In that case a powder mill exploded, due to no fault of
the defendant company. The injury to the plaintiff's property
was consequential rather than a trespass, for no act on the part
of the defendant was alleged or proved. To that extent the case
is squarely in point wiht our own situation. In holding for the
plaintiff the Court stated that it is the duty of every one so to use
his own property as not to injure another, and it was also said
in the opinion by Judge Brannon that negligence was an unnecessary allegation in the declaration. The cases are still squarely
on all fours. Now although the actual decision was based on the
theory that the powder mill was a nuisance,-and we should not
call an airplane by that name,--certainly the language of the
Phoenix case is broad enough to include our own aviation case. In
line with this we have the New York decision of Sullivan v. Dunkam,' in which it was held that, by public policy, the safety of
persons and property and the public generally
"is superior in right to a particular use of a single piece
of property by its owner. It renders the enjoyment of all
property more secure, by preventing a use of one piece by one
man as may injure all his neighbors".
This case allowed recovery for personal injuries. No negligence
was involved and, although a blasting case, the decision is not
based on the nuisance theory, but imposes absolute liability.
There is another way, however. Negligence could be alleged
in the declaration and no proof of it required at the trial. Although the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher has been expressly repudiated, a later West Virginia case quotes that famous English
rule almost verbatim and then goes on to say, in regard to the
bursting of a water tank,
"The rule of res ipsa loquitur applies. If the person
whose duty it was to keep the tank in repair had not been
negligent in some respect, the tank would not have burst
......
We are compelled to say as a question of law proof
of the bursting of the hoops was also proof of the defendant's
negligence".
-40 W. Va: 413, 21 S. E. 1035 (1895).
161 N. Y. 290, 55 N. E. 923 (1900).
0 Mercantile Co. v. Thurmand, 68 W. Va. 530, 70 S. E. 126 (1911).
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In a still later case,' this principle was affirmed and defendant's
evidence as to due care in construction and maintenance of the
tank was rejected. Certainly water stored on one's premises is
not any more likely to cause harm to others than is the flight of
an airplane. So, on the basis of these cases, the Court could say
that proof of the fall of the plane is proof of defendant's negligence, in the absence of any act or omission of a third party, as
in our first two classifications. It is submitted that these cases
are unsound, and that their application to our needs would be
equally unsound, therefore, this solution is not recommended. The
second sentence in the quoted passage is a clear non sequitur.
In answering any argument that absolute liability on the pilot
in cases within the third and fourth classifications would impose
an unjust burden on aviation and would hinder its progress, it
is only necessary to point to the great strides England has made
in the field of aeronautics since 1920, when their absolute liability
statute took effect."" As to accidents caused by latent defects, for
which the aviator is blameless, it should be remembered that the
landsman is equally without fault,-we are simply putting the
burden on the party who made the accident possible, and in doing
so we should perhaps allow him to recover his damages from the
manufacturer,-but that question exceeds the bounds of our discussion.
The next classification of cases is as follows:
5. Where an act of God causes the damage complained
of, regardless of the will of the pilot.
As to cases within this classification, the authorities are uniform
in holding no liability, and the writer submits that this rule should
apply to aviators as well as to others. Our only difficulty is in
deiermining when the facts of any particular case would justify its
removal from the fourth classification to the fifth. Although a
condition of the atmosphere sometimes called an "air-pocket"
would be a condition due to Nature and natural forces alone, the
writer believes that such a condition, being one of the characteristic
dangers of aviation, the possibility of which is to be anticipated in
any aerial flight, should not properly be termed "an act of God"
in any action against the aviator by a landsman,-although in
the case of a passenger, who would assume such a risk, the rule
should be different. It may be admitted that the sinking of a
Wiegal v. City of Parkersburg, 74 W. Va. 25, 81 S. E. 554 (1914).
10 & 11 Geo. V. Ch. 80.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol37/iss3/4

10

Hearne: The Liability of an Aviator for Damage to Persons and Property on

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

279

seaworthy ship -in as.Btorm on the; high, seas, although forseeable,
may,be an "act of God" for which the, owners would not be liable
to passengers or shippers, of property. But such persons also act,
by their going aboard the vessel or loading on: of their freight, so
that their acts continue and concur with the "act of God". But
when an airworthy airplane "sinks", although :the aviator may
not be liable to his passengers or shippers,, the.-landsman in the
path of his fall has not acted concurrently with any "act of God",
nor has lhe assented to any risk. It is therefore submitted that
the courts, should at all times keep in mind the inherent dangers
of an aerial flight which might be encountered, and the fact thatthe landsman consents to none of these dangers, and be strict in
their determinations as to what constitutes 'f acts of God" in such
cases. (No doubt the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce would
contend that a snowstorm at an altitude of less than one thousand
feetanywhere in sunny California, at any time, of the year, would
surely be an "act of God''-and the writer does not care to dis-:
pute that contention. If that is so, then the Wheeling, West Virginia, Chamber of Commerce should ibe sustained in & contention
that an earthquake anywhere in West Virginia, at any time of the
year, which causes atmospheric conditions dangerous, to aviation,
would be an "act of God".)

tei'us consider now our lastgroup of case-es
s
6.t here the very act of lawfully navigating the plane
inthe intended course of flight is the act complained of. Ths
situation should be divided into
I
(a) Cases in which there, is impact, as where defendant loses his way in the night and, encounters a highly perched water tank; and
(b) Cases in which there is no impact, as where
defendant flies above plaintiff'S pasture, thereby frightening plaintiff's cattle °so-as-to injure them.
In classification 6(a), it is submitted that liability should depend
on whether or not the damage results from some possible danger
characteristic of an aerial flight. If a commercial airline pilot loses
his way in a storm at night and crashes into the top of a highly
perched water tank, for example, the writer would say that the
damage does result from such a cause and that liability should be
imposed on the same basis as in the third or fourth classifications.
It is probable, however, that there will be few cases within this
classification in which the question of absolute liability will arise,
because negligence will undoubtedly be responsible for by far the
greater part of the collisions in which the very act of piloting the
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plane causes the injury, while if the aviator is violating the minimum safe altitude law we have trespass quare clausum fregit.'
As to cases within classification 6(b), it is submitted that the
general rules of tort law should apply. Injuries without impact,
where the defendant is acting lawfully and in the exercise of due
care, are generally held to be without remedy, and there is no
reason why aviation should be set apart from other pursuits and
a penalty inflicted upon it. A decision of the Comptroller General of the United States held no liability on the part of the Government for damages to plaintiff's cattle and fence caused by a
stampede, brought about by fright when an Army airplane crossed
plaintiff's pasture to land in an adjoining field, no negligence or
unlawful act on the part of the pilot having been shown. Of
course, if the aviator continually hovers about over plaintiff's
premises so that the noise constitutes a nuisance, he should be subject to an injunction in the same manner as one who continually
plays a loud Victrola on his own property to the great annoyance
of a neighbor across the street.' Also, if an airplane endangers a
landowner by stunt flying above his house, it has been held that
an injunction for nuisance is the proper remedy, while the blowing
of dust on one's land by propellers at an adjoining airport may
also be enjoined."0
This article has been chiefly concerned with cases in which the
aviator has been lawfully avigating his aircraft in the exercise of
due care and in which someone on the ground is the person who
seeks to recover. In view of the fact that statutes in many states,"
and in England' and various other foreign countries," impose absolute liability on the owners of aircraft in such cases, (in the absence of contributory negligence, of course) the writer believes
that this discussion is timely for, as pointed out, there are various
"IAnother feature which might be considered in this connection, perhaps
at some later date, is the use to which the subjacent land is put. In some
cases it is possible that the landsman may be making an unreasonable use
of his land under the circumstances, or that he may be guilty of contributory
negligence.
' 3 Comp. Gen. 234, 1928 U. S. Av. R. 46.
"Stodder v. Rosen Talking Machine Co., 241 Mass. 245, 135 N. E. 251
(1922). See also Appeal of Ladies' Art Club, 10 Sadler (Pa.) 150, 13 Atl.
537 (1888); Powell v. Bentley Gerwig Furniture Co., 34 W. Va. 804, 12 S. E.

1085 (1891).
Johnson v. Curtiss Northwest Airplane Co., 1928 .U. S. Av. R. 42.

40Swetland v. Curtiss Airports, supra n. 11.

citation of statutes, supra n. 2.
10 & 11 Geo. V. Ch. 80.
Bogert, loc. cit. supra n. 1.

4See
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situations in which it would be unfair to impose liability on the
pilot of an aircraft, while in many more cases it would be unfair
to hold the owner liable for acts of his agent for which the agent
is exempt. Aviation may in time become as important in transportation, and as safe, as the railroads are today,-and we should,
therefore, be cautious in enunciating broad rules for the imposition
of liability, which we might later regret. We should take each case
as it comes and thereby be in a position to do justice in each case.
Although new factual situations will have to be met, it is probable
that the appropriate tort rules are sufficiently flexible to meet
these situations, except possibly in the case of stowaways. There
is a square conflict of opinion on this point,-some people, including the writer, believing that a stowaway should be heaved overboard with neatness and dispatch, while others are in favor of a
gold medal and a "fat" movie contract.
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